Covert Operations

Covert operations, sometimes referred to as CoveOps or covert actions, involve the use of clandestine intelligence-gathering and manipulation techniques. They may be used to destabilize a hostile power or to bolster a friendly one.

The CIA under Eisenhower carried out numerous covert operations, 사람찾기흥신소 almost all against putative communist foes in the Third World. Kennedy established rules on approvals that endured, and that required the involvement of Congress.

Political action

One of the earliest covert operations was political action, which involves fomenting democratic institutions and values. Intelligence agencies can use a variety of methods to achieve political action, including influencing elections and funding journals and newspapers. However, they should always be careful to maintain a strict separation between analysis and clandestine collection, as this helps them approach information collected with skepticism and objectivity.

Political action requires the use of a network of agents to influence government policy or public opinion in a foreign country. The agents can be taskable agents of the attacking power or, as Lenin purportedly advocated, apologists for the target state known as “useful idiots.” The recruitment and employment of mercenaries, which is categorized as paramilitary activity, has long been a part of covert action.

The problem with the use of covert action is that it often comes with a price. It can be sloppy and uncontrolled, and it can tarnish the reputation of the United States. As a result, it is crucial to have a process of oversight in place that does not compromise national security or the efficiency of the agency. To balance these concerns, reforms should first seek changes that do not reduce the effectiveness of covert action or increase the danger of abuse. Such measures may include establishing a committee of oversight for covert operations and providing greater access to the records of these operations.

Paramilitary activity

Many historians with an interest in covert action have argued that paramilitary activity during the Cold War did not accomplish the objectives set for those actions; was not consistent with prevailing national policy and strategy; and made no significant contributions to national security. However, critics have often misunderstood a key distinction between paramilitary activity and intelligence activities. This confusion has led to a great deal of misguided criticism.

Paramilitary activity is typically defined as an attempt to achieve a political goal through the use of non-conventional methods. These methods can include military-style combat, sabotage, and assassinations. They can also involve the use of proxy or terrorist forces. In the past, a number of these clandestine actions have been successful, including the American support of guerrillas in the American Revolution and the British support of Boer commandos during World War II.

Although the CIA has a long history of conducting paramilitary operations, Congress and the executive branch have imposed a series of reforms after the Iran-Contra scandal. The Commission on Intelligence Reorganization, for example, recommended that lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary activities should shift to the Defense Department from the CIA where it has traditionally been housed. The Department of Defense is best suited to assume this responsibility because it possesses the legislative authority and authorizations required for paramilitary activities under existing statutes.

Psychological warfare

During Covert operations, psychological warfare aims to influence the values, beliefs, emotions, reasoning, and motives of a foreign audience. This type of propaganda can be delivered via broadcasts, films, pamphlets, and leaflets. It may also take the form of disinformation or false flag campaigns, which are aimed at misleading the public.

This type of warfare, which Jomini referred to as wars “of opinion,” can be conducted by the military, civilians, or other institutions. These campaigns may be aimed at a single person or a specific group of people. Often, they are designed to create public dissent and confusion about the war effort.

A significant challenge of psychological warfare is that it must remain effective despite the changing environments and technology of modern society. In addition, psychological warfare cannot be constrained by physical boundaries or the resources of a state. Whether it is defeating an enemy armor battalion or injecting a computer virus into a competitor, psychological warfare must be effective in any situation.

In the United States, the practice of psychological warfare is usually carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency, although members of the military’s special-forces units participate in some instances. In addition, the CIA must obtain presidential approval before engaging in these activities. This must be documented in a document called a finding and must be provided to key members of Congress, such as the leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees.

Economic warfare

The recruitment and employment of mercenaries during covert operations dates back to the eleventh century. This activity is categorized as paramilitary activities and can be considered a form of economic warfare. However, the use of mercenaries during covert missions is not always effective or ethical. It is important to consider the costs and benefits of these efforts. Moreover, the decision to use mercenaries must be taken by the highest levels of government.

In general, the economic ramifications of covert operations should not be considered separately from their political impact on the target country. For example, the CIA’s attempts to foment resistance against communist governments in Latin America and Africa have resulted in severe economic damage to those countries. However, it is difficult to determine the overall effect of these actions on a global level because of the many factors involved in the economy.

Separating the functions of clandestine intelligence gathering from those of covert action would seriously harm the United States. It could also sully the reputation of the agency in the world community. The symbiosis between these two functions allows them to be coordinated for mutual benefit.

A thorough cost-benefit analysis is the key to responsible covert action. It is a mistake to look forward without learning from the past. The history of covert operations shows that lasting costs outweigh transient gains. It is for this reason that a process of continual review is necessary.